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ACTA – RISKS OF THIRD-PARTY 








In its current near-final draft form, the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement [ACTA] being negotiated plurilaterally—and largely secretly—
by a self-selected group of countries proposes to allow preliminary and final 
injunctive relief against third parties (third-party enforcement) to prevent 
infringement of intellectual property rights and/or to prevent infringing 
goods from entering into the channels of commerce.  There is lingering 
uncertainty whether the relevant civil enforcement section will apply to the 
entire range of intellectual property rights or whether patents will be 
excluded.  If patents are excluded, the dangers in ACTA would be reduced 
but not eliminated—new globalized forms of third-party enforcement would 
still pose unprecedented risks to the lawful trade of generic medicines.  
Extending third-party liability and imposing interlocutory and/or permanent 
injunctions against (1) innocent active pharmaceutical ingredient suppliers 
whose materials are used in the manufacture of patent infringing medicines 
or in mislabeled products without their knowledge, (2) transporters who use 
international channels of trade through countries where the “patent 
manufacturing fiction” or “trademark confusion” claims might apply, and 
(3) other actors in the global procurement and supply of medicines, could 
interfere with goal of robust generic competition and access to medicine.  
Under the risk of preliminary and permanent injunctions, and contempt of 
court sanctions for violating such injunctions, API suppliers would 
predictably shy away from selling base ingredients to generic producers, 
entities like the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
(Global Fund) the U.S. PEPFAR Supply Chain Management System 
(SCMS) could be deterred from funding the purchase of generic medicines, 
and shippers might refuse to transport finished generic medicines through 
ordinary transshipment routes involving ACTA signatories.  Health activists 
must collaborate globally to eliminate or at the very least reduce these risks. 
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In its current, near-final draft form,2 the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA) being negotiated plurilaterally—and largely secretly—
by a self-selected group of countries3 proposes to allow preliminary and 
final injunctive relief against third parties (third-party enforcement) to 
prevent infringement of intellectual property rights and/or to prevent 
infringing goods from entering into the channels of commerce.  There is 
lingering uncertainty whether the relevant civil enforcement and injunction 
section will apply to the entire range of intellectual property rights4 covered 
by the TRIPS Agreement5 or whether patents will be excluded as proposed 
by the U.S.6  If patents are exclude the health risks in ACTA will be 
reduced but not eliminated.  In the context of access to medicines, new 
globalized forms of third-party enforcement, like its predecessor, 
intermediary service provider liability, poses unprecedented risks to the 
                                                 
2 Consolidated Text—Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Informal Predecisional/ 
Deliberative Draft:  Oct. 2, 2010, PIJIP IP ENFORCEMENT DATABASE, 
http://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta (follow “Official Text - October 2, 2010” 
hyperlink) [hereinafter ACTA – Oct. 2, 2010] (reflecting changes made during September 
2010 Tokyo Round). 
3 In October 2007 the United States, the European Community, Switzerland and Japan 
simultaneously announced that they would negotiate a new intellectual property 
enforcement treaty.  Australia, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Mexico, Jordan, 
Morocco, Singapore, the United Arab Emirates and Canada have joined the negotiations. 
4 According to proposed Art. 1.X:  Definitions, “intellectual property means all 
categories of intellectual property that are the subject of Sections 1 though 7 of Part II of 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.”  ACTA – Oct. 2, 
2010.  Those sections of TRIPS, in turn cover:  copyrights and related rights; trademarks; 
geographical indications; industrial designs; patents; layouts (topographies) of integrated 
circuits; and protection of undisclosed information.   
5 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1C of 
the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Agreement (1994), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm. 
6 ACTA – Oct. 2, 2010, supra note 2, n.2:  {US:  For the purpose of this Agreement, 
Parties agree that patents do not fall within the scope of this Section.}. 
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lawful trade of generic medicines.  Extending third-party enforcement and 
imposing interlocutory and permanent injunctions against (1) innocent 
active pharmaceutical ingredient (API) suppliers whose materials are used 
in the manufacture of patent infringing medicines or in mislabeled products 
without their knowledge, (2) transporters who use international channels of 
commerce through countries where the “patent manufacturing fiction” or 
“trademark confusion” claims might apply, and (3) other actors in the 
global procurement, supply, and even registration of medicines, could 
interfere with the goal of robust generic competition and access to 
medicine.  Under the risk of injunctions and contempt of court penalties, 
API and other suppliers would predictably shy away from selling base 
ingredients to generic producers, entities like the Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund), the U.S. PEPFAR Supply 
Chain Management System (SCMS) could be deterred from funding the 
purchase of generic medicines, and shippers might refuse to transport 
finished generic medicines through ordinary transshipment routes involving 
ACTA signatories.  These threats to access to medicines must be addressed 
by a global coalition of AIDS, health, and trade activists. 
 
II. ACTA’S KEY PROVISIONS:  MOVEMENT FROM INTERMEDIARY TO THIRD-
PARTY ENFORCEMENT 
 
The Public Predecisional/Deliberative Draft of the Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement dated April 20107 (April Predecisional Draft) contained 
multiple threats to access to medicines.  The mostly widely discussed issue 
involved the seizure of goods-in-transit following the detention of multiple 
drug shipments by Dutch customs authorities in 2008 and 2009 under the 
authority of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1383/2003.8  Dutch authorities 
applied the judicially created rule that the IP status of in-transit medicines 
should be judged under the fiction that the medicines had been 
manufactured in the Netherlands9 and thus responded to Big Pharma seizure 
                                                 
7 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Public Predecisional/Deliberative Draft:  
April 21, 2010 PIJIP IP ENFORCEMENT DATABASE, 
http://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta (follow “Official Consolidated ACTA Text 
Prepared for Public Release, April 21, 2010” hyperlink) [hereinafter ACTA Draft – Apr. 
21, 2010].  
8 Council Regulation 1383/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 196/7) (EC), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:196:0007:0014:EN:PDF.  
9 Cf. Sosecal v. Sisvel, District Court in The Hague (2008), available at 
http://www.eplawpatentblog.com/PDF_December09/The%20Hague%20DC%20Sisvel%20
v%20Sosecal%20EN.pdf.  See Frederick J. Abbott, Seizures of Generic Pharmaceuticals in 
Transit Based on Allegations of Patent Infringement:  A Threat to International Trade, 
Development and Public Welfare, 1 W.I.P.O.J., 43, 47 (2009); Frank Eijsvogels, SISVEL V. 
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requests by impounding and delaying shipments of life-saving medicines 
bound from India, where they had been lawfully manufactured and 
exported, to countries in Africa and Latin America, where they would have 
been lawfully imported, marketed and consumed.  These seizures and the 
E.U.’s delayed and defensive response to expressions of diplomatic and 
human rights concern prompted India and Brazil to initiated dispute 
resolution procedures at the World Trade Organization.10 
Unfortunately, the risks of the April Predecisional Draft to public health 
and to the lawful international trade of generic medicines are not limited to 
border-seizures by customs agents policing phantom patent rights.  A risk 
also arose from provisions that subjected so-called “intermediaries” to 
interlocutory and permanent injunctions, known elsewhere as interdicts.  
The use of such injunctions against API manufacturers, international 
shippers, and other participants in the global trade of medicines could 
inhibit supply and distribution systems and thereby deter generic entry, 
robust generic competition, and legitimate international trade of generic 
medicines of assured quality, especially if the civil enforcement provisions 
were to be applied with respect to all intellectual property rights as 
proposed by some negotiators, including the E.C.11 
Bracketed Article 2.X.2:  Injunctions provided that “The Parties [may] 
shall ensure that right holders are in a position to apply for an injunction 
against [infringing] intermediaries whose services are used by a third party 
to infringe an intellectual property right.”12 Footnote 8 noted that the 
“conditions and procedures relating to such injunction will be left to each 
Party’s legal system.”  Earlier leaks revealed that this article was proposed 
                                                                                                                            
SOSECAL:  ACTING AGAINST TRANSIT GOODS STILL POSSIBLE UNDER THE ANTI PIRACY 
REGULATION IN THE NETHERLANDS, IP Intelligence Eur. (Howrey L.L.P., Amsterdam, 
Netherlands), 2008, 10. 
10 European Union and a Member State [India] – Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, 
WTO Dispute Settlement DS408, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds408_e.htm and European Union 
and a Member State [Brazil] – Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, WTO Dispute 
Settlement DS409, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds409_e.htm; see generally Third 
World Network, India, Brazil raise dispute over EU drug seizures, 6924 SUNS May 17, 
2010, available at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/wto.info/2010/twninfo100509.htm; 
Intellectual Property Watch, Consultations on WTO Drug Transit Case Continue, 
September 16, 2010, available at http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/2010/09/16/consultations-on-wto-case-on-drugs-in-transit-continue/; 
C.H. Unnikrishan, India may move WTO as it seeks to resolve EU dispute, livemint.com, 
October 10, 2010, available at http://www.livemint.com/2010/10/11225420/India-may-
move-WTO-as-it-seeks.html.  
11 ACTA Draft – Apr. 21, 2010, supra note 7, art. 2.1 contains alternative coverage 
proposals:  any intellectual property right vs. copyrights and related rights and trademarks 
only. 
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by the European Commission.   Similarly, bracketed Article 2.5X provided 
that “[a]n interlocutory injunction may also be issued, under the same 
conditions {to prevent any imminent infringement of an intellectual 
property right}, against any [infringing] intermediary whose services are 
being used by a third party to infringe an intellectual property right.”13  It 
was undecided whether the provision of injunctions against intermediaries 
would be mandatory (shall … ensure) or permissive (may … ensure).  In 
either event, there would be an in terrorem effect.  A related concept to 
intermediary liability was the proposed criminal responsibility of persons or 
entities that incite, aid, or abet cases of willful trademark counterfeiting or 
copyright or related rights piracy on a commercial scale.14  The enforcement 
of intermediary liability would have been facilitated by proposed Article 
2.4, which allowed broad discovery of intermediary activities, particularly 
those involving production and distribution, during civil enforcement 
procedures against alleged infringers.15  
The key operative term, “intermediaries,” was undefined in the April 
Predecisional Draft, as was the alternative term “infringing intermediary.”  
Likewise, what constituted “services” used by another to infringe an 
intellectual property right was also unclear.  Previously, the concept 
“intermediary services” had been analyzed most closely with respect to 
internet service providers (ISPs).16  In these circumstances, an ISP that 
merely provided facilities that were used by others for an infringement, i.e. 
to download a digital copy of a song, book or movie, might be interdicted.  
Given the lack of definition, access-to-knowledge activists were concerned 
                                                                                                                            
12 ACTA Draft – Apr. 21, 2010, supra note 7. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. art. 2.15.2. 
15 Id. art. 2.4 [“Without prejudice to other statutory provisions which, in particular, 
govern the protection of confidentiality of information sources or the processing of 
personal data,] Each Party shall provide that in civil judicial proceedings concerning the 
enforcement of [intellectual property rights][copyright or related rights and trademarks], 
its judicial authorities shall have the authority upon a justified request of the right holder, 
to order the [alleged] infringer [including an alleged infringer] to provide, [for the purpose 
of collecting evidence] any [relevant] information [information on the origin and 
distribution network of the infringing goods or services][in the form as prescribed in its 
applicable laws and regulations] that the infringer possesses or controls, [where 
appropriate,] to the right holder or to the judicial authorities. Such information may 
include information regarding any person or persons involved in any aspect of the 
infringement and regarding the means of production or distribution channel of such goods 
or services, including the identification of third persons involved in the production and 
distribution of the infringing goods or services or in their channels of distribution. [For 
greater clarity, this provision does not apply to the extent that it would conflict with 
common law or statutory privileges, such as legal professional privilege.]”). 
16 These concerns have not been completely eliminated in the new ACTA text.  
Michael Geist, ACTA Lite:  The U.S. Cave on the Internet Chapter Complete, October 6, 
2010, available at http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/5352/125/.  
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that the terms “intermediaries” or “infringing intermediaries” might not 
only be applied to ISPs but might also be extended to libraries, cultural 
institutions, and educational institutions, although their application to mail 
or telecommunications providers was deemed unlikely.17  Internet and 
copyright activists were also concerned that providing for injunctions might 
create incentives for ISPs and other intermediaries to take on new roles as 
extra-judicial enforcement arms of the courts and, most especially, of rights 
holders.   
In part because of health activist concern about the impact of 
intermediary liability on access to medicines18 and because of a lack of 
clarity about the territorial reach of injunctive powers, the intermediary 
liability language of in the April Predecisional Draft was dropped in the 
September 2010 Consolidated Text of ACTA and the concept of third-party 
enforcement was introduced in its place. Pursuant to the revised Civil 
Enforcement—Provision Measures section:  "Each Party shall provide that 
its judicial authorities shall have the authority to order prompt and effective 
provisional measures:  against a party, or where appropriate, against a third 
party over whom the relevant judicial authority exercises jurisdiction, to 
prevent an infringement of any intellectual property rights from occurring, 
and in particular to prevent infringing goods from entering into the 
channels of commerce."19  Likewise, with respect to its Civil Enforcement 
Injunctions section:  “Each Party shall provide that, in civil judicial 
proceedings concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights, its 
judicial authorities shall have the authority to issue an order against a party 
to desist from an infringement, and inter alia, an order to that party or, 
where appropriate, to a third party over whom the relevant judicial 
authority exercises jurisdiction, to prevent infringing goods from entering 
into the channels of commerce.”20  
Admittedly, the necessity of having a personal and territorial 
jurisdiction over a third party is at least referenced by the amended text,21 
                                                 
17 See Kimberlee Weatherall, THE ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT:  
ANALYSIS OF THE JANUARY CONSOLIDATED TEXT (April 2010), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1019&context=kimweatherall.  
18 See, e.g., Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property, International 
Experts Find that Pending Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Threatens Public Interests 
(Jun. 23, 2010), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/acta-communique; 
Berkeley Declaration on Intellectual Property Enforcement and Access to Medicines, 2010, 
available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Berkeley_Declaration.pdf; AVAAZ, ACTA 
– People Before Profit, available at http://www.avaaz.org/en/acta/.   
19 ACTA, supra note 2, Art. 2.5:1(a) (emphasis added). 
20 Id. Art. 2.X.1 (emphasis added). 
21 Injunctions are usually limited in their application to activities occurring within the 
geographic territory of the issuing jurisdiction, but jurisdiction sometimes extends to 
7 PIJIP Research Paper No. 2010-01 
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but an additional confusing phrase—entering into the channels of 
commerce—enters the picture.  It is unclear why provisional measures can 
be used to address any intellectual property infringement, of which 
preventing the infringing goods from entering the channels of commerce is 
but one example, but that final injunctions are limited solely to preventing 
infringing goods from entering into channels of commerce.  Paradoxically, 
provisional measures might be used to temporarily enjoin production, 
before full commercialization, but final injunctions might not be able do so, 
depending on the eventual interpretation of how long, deep, and wide the 
channels of commerce actually are. 
The April Predecisional Draft provision requiring production of 
information "regarding any person or persons involved in any aspect of the 
infringement and regarding the means of production or distribution channel 
of such goods and services," has been adopted unchanged.22  With respect 
to criminal enforcement, the April Predecisional Draft provision has been 
modied somewhat to exclude incitement and to require that "Each party 
shall ensure that criminal liability for aiding and abetting is available under 
its law."23  
 
III. APPLYING INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY AND THIRD-PARTY ENFORCEMENT 
TO PHARMACEUTICALS 
 
In the context of access to medicines, the concept “intermediary 
services” was quite ominous.  Services were obviously provided by ISPs 
that allowed suppliers to market medicines on-line, and, also in the 
pharmaceutical context, by shipping agents.24  However, services were also 
                                                                                                                            
extraterritorial activities that adversely impact in-territory interests.  Under a strict 
territorial rule, to enjoin third-party enablement of IP infringement in India, first there 
would have to be an infringement of a territorial IP right in India that the third party was 
facilitating, and second, the injunction would have to be issued in India against the 
importation, manufacturing, or export of the third-party-provided service or materials.  
However, if more expansive extra-territorial jurisdiction applied, the transit country could 
issue an injunction against the third party’s activities in other countries to the extent that 
those activities had or would predictably impact in-territory events.  In such circumstances, 
a third party might be enjoined in the Netherlands for supplying APIs to an infringing 
generic manufacturer in India that had or intended to transship through the Netherlands. 
A full discussion of extraterritorial jurisdiction is clearly beyond the scope of this short 
article, but a discussion of some of the relevant principles can be found in American Law 
Institute, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PRINCIPLES GOVERNING JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF 
LAW, AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES (2008). 
22 ACTA, supra note 2, Art. 2.4. 
23 Id. art. 2.14:4. 
24 See Thomas Schachl, German Federal Supreme Court Confirms Broad 
Responsibility of Forwarding Agents for Handled Goods; Increased Requirements to 
Examine Compliance of Handled Goods With German Patent Law, THE BARDEHLE 
8 ACTA: Risks of Third-Party Enforcement for Access to Medicines  
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supplied by lawyers and accountants, communications service providers, 
and factory workers.  Although we do not usually consider suppliers of 
components—for example, API and inert ingredient suppliers—to be 
providing a “service,” if components were deemed to be services, then all 
medicines component suppliers could have been found to be 
“intermediaries” who had contributed services instantiated in to the 
manufacture and distribution of the final-product, an IP-infringing generic 
medicine, and would thus be subject to an injunction.25   
Finally, and perhaps more ominously, many others who helped to fund 
or facilitate purchases of generic drugs as they as they moved through the 
stream of international commerce from producer to consumer could have 
faced intermediary liability.  For example, the Global Fund solicits and 
funds country-led proposals for funding priority disease prevention, 
treatment, and care.26  More to the point, it now provides a voluntary 
pooled-procurement service for medicines27 and maintains tight control 
over purchases of particular tuberculosis28 and malaria29 medicines.  Will 
the Global Fund—and similarly funding/facilitating services such as those 
offered by UNITAID,30 the Clinton Health Access Initiative (CHAI),31 
                                                                                                                            
PAGENBERG IP REPORT (Bardehle Pagenberg, Düsseldorf, Ger.), 2010/I, at 6 (summarizing 
a German Court ruling granting injunctive relief against a shipping agent who delivered 
allegedly patent infringing MP3 players), available at http://www.bardehle.com/fileadmin 
/bardehle/sonstiges/IP_Reports/IP_Report_2010_I.pdf.  See also Trade Enforcement Act of 
2009, S. 1466, 111th Cong. § 223(2)(C)-(D) (2009), and Customs Facilitation and Trade 
Enforcement Reauthorization Act of 2009, S. 1631, 111th Cong. § 234(a)-(d) (2009) 
(supporting the inference that the enforcement agenda seeks to disrupt each and every link 
in the distribution chain).  See ACTA Draft – Apr. 21, 2010, supra note 7, § 2, art. 2.4 
(supporting the argument that intermediary liability will routinely extend to shippers by 
including a direct reference to distribution and channels of distribution). 
25 See ACTA, supra note 7, §2 art. 2.3(2) (obviously permitting the destruction of 
APIs used in the “manufacture” of generic medicines). 
26 About the Global Fund, available at 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/about/?lang=en.  
27 See Global Fund Observer, AIDSPAN, http://www.aidspan.org/documents/gfo/GFO-
Issue-127.htm (last visited Aug. 27, 2010) (“[Principal Recipients] from 37 countries . . . 
have joined the Voluntary Pooled Procurement (VPP) system.  Discussions are ongoing 
with PRs from another 20 countries.  The VPP has now registered 130 orders, with a total 
value of $335 million.  Ten countries have signed up for capacity building and supply chain 
management assistance.”).  
28 See THE GLOBAL FUND, GUIDE TO THE GLOBAL FUND’S POLICIES ON PROCUREMENT 
AND SUPPLY MANAGEMENT 12 (2009) (“All procurement of medications for Multi-Drug 
Resistant TB (tuberculosis) must be conducted through the Green Light Committee.”), 
available at http://www.theglobalfund.org/ 
documents/psm/pp_guidelines_procurement_supplymanagement_en.pdf. 
29 See Affordable Medicines Facility – malaria, THE GLOBAL FUND, 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/Amfm/ (last visited Aug. 27, 2010). 
30 See UNITAID, UNITAID CONST. §1, available at 
http://www.unitaid.eu/images/governance/ utd_constitution_05-07_en.pdf (describing that 
as part of the WHO, UNITAID’s express mission is to increase market impact on access to 
9 PIJIP Research Paper No. 2010-01 
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SCMS,32 IDA Foundation,33 Medecins San Frontieres,34 and even 
UNICEF35—fear that their access-to-medicines resources and activities 
could have been considered intermediary services to third-party infringers 
whose medicines might inadvertently violate a fictional in-transit patent rule 
or an opaque in-transit trademark confusion rule?36  Even further afield, 
could a drug regulatory authority that registered a generic medicine that 
later violated a fictional in-transit patent rule or an in-transit trademark 
confusion rule also have been held liable for intermediary-service 
liability?37 
Unfortunately, the switch to the concept of third-party enforcement in 
the current ACTA text does little or nothing to allay the risks to access to 
generic medicines described above.  One can still gather information about 
third parties with respect to means of production and distribution channels; 
one may still seek temporary and permanent injunctions against third parties 
to prevent infringing goods from entering channels of commerce, and in the 
case of provisional measures also temporarily enjoin other alleged acts of 
infringement; and the state may still impose criminal sanctions against those 
who aid and abet criminal infringement activities.   
In particular, there are many uncertainties in the meaning and scope of 
application of these provisions with respect to the entering into the channels 
of commerce concept.  Distributors and transporters seem at particular risk 
as they may directly enable a territorial infringement by transporting the 
infringing product or content into the country of enforcement and thereby 
place infringing products squarely in the middle of channels of commerce.  
In addition, component suppliers might also be liable to provisional 
                                                                                                                            
HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria medicines by increasing market competition.).  
31 See Clinton Health Access Initiative, http://www.clintonfoundation.org/what-we-
do/clinton-health-access-initiative/ (describing the goals and purpose of CHAI). 
32 See Supply Chain Management System, http://scms.pfscm.org/scms/about 
(describing the mission and purpose of the SCMS). 
33 See IDA Foundation, http://www.ida.nl/ (describing the mission and purpose of the 
IDA). 
34 See Medecins Sans Frontieres, 
http://www.msf.org/msfinternational/content/medical/pharmaceutical/index.cfm?&mode=v
iew (listing information about MSF’s drug procurement policies and activities). 
35 See UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/supply/index.html. 
36 See THE GLOBAL FUND, supra note 28, at 20 (detailing The Global Fund’s current 
requirements that recipients comply with national laws and applicable international 
obligations in the field of intellectual property).  Because of intermediary liability concerns, 
will The Global Fund now have take on new duties to double-check and confirm the 
intellectual property status of medicines purchases it finances under international law (the 
TRIPS Agreement), the law of the country of use, and the law of every transit country? 
37 Drug regulatory authorities typically assess medicines for quality, safety, and 
efficacy and therefore register (or approve) the medicine for marketing within the country.  
By doing so, drug regulatory authorities would arguably enable the lawful distribution and 
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measures since enjoining them could arguably prevent the offending 
product from being made in the first place at the front end of the “entering” 
into the channels of commerce continuum.  Similarly, it is conceivable, 
though perhaps not as likely, that other enablers of commercialization, 
including procurement agents like Medicines San Frontiere and the 
International Dispensary Association, funders like PEPFAR, the Global 
Fund, and UNITAID, and regulators like drug regulatory authorities could 
also be temporarily enjoined to prevent the commercialization and 
distribution of alleged IP infringing products.  Whether criminal “aiding and 
abetting” extends to suppliers of subsidiary materials and other enablers, 
who thereby contribute either to the production or commercialization of the 
offending products, is perhaps less certain; but the possibility of criminal 
liability is certainly troubling.  
It is clearly possible that APIs and even inert ingredients can be used in 
the manufacture of patent infringing products.  Likewise, it is possible that 
non-patent-infringing medicines might be intentionally or misleadingly 
mislabeled so as to allegedly infringe a valid trademark.  In these 
circumstances and under existing law, the right holder ordinarily would 
have full recourse against the infringer in the country of manufacture and/or 
the country of marketing and use.  However, it was undesirable to impose a 
second tier of liability on third-party suppliers and distributors who often 
lacked knowledge of the IP status of the product at issue.  It would clog the 
channels of commerce to require suppliers and shippers to double-check the 
patent and eventual trademark status of all of their customers.  In such 
circumstances, suppliers and shippers might choose to boycott generic 
manufacturers altogether rather than risk civil and perhaps even criminal 
sanctions.38  
Moreover, ACTA will still allow border/customs enforcement 
procedures by right holders and ex-officio at export, in-transit, and import 
borders with to respect to alleged trademark and copyright claims.39  Patent-
related seizures had previously been made based on the in-country 
manufacturing fiction40 and thus could obviously have implicated third 
                                                                                                                            
sale of alleged IP infringing medicines and thus be subject to intermediary liability.  
38 See ACTA Draft – Apr. 21, 2010, supra note 7, art. 2.15(2) and ACTA – Oct. 2, 
2010, supra note 2, art. 2.14.4 (imposing criminal sanctions on those who aid and abet 
willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright or related rights piracy on a commercial 
scale). 
39 ACTA, supra note 2, Section 3:  Border Measures. 
40 See Request for Consultations by India, European Union and a Member State – 
Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, WT/DS408/1 (May 19, 2010) (requesting 
consultations over multiple European seizures of in-transit generic medicines on alleged 
patent grounds, especially in the Netherlands, including one case involving AIDS 
medicines purchased by UNITAID and being shipped from India to Nigeria), available at 
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parties had the coverage of the border measures provision not been changed 
to exclude patents.41  Although trademark-related seizures have been 
fewer,42 a third-party API supplier, procurement service, or shipper, could 
still be alleged to have contributed to an eventual product that was 
misleadingly or confusingly labeled.  One plausible ground for mistaken 
assessment of confusion might arise from the fact that both a brand name 
and generic drug will display the required international non-proprietary 
name (INN) for the active ingredient.  Moreover, both the brand name 
holder and the generic company might use portions of the INN in their own 
brand names.  In these circumstances, allegations of actionable trademark 
confusion and of third-party liability could arise.  Similarly, to avoid 
confusion for consumers and to maintain bioequivalence,43 the trade dress 
of a branded and generic medicine might also be appropriately similar but 
trade-dress confusing.44  Once again, third parties might be held liable even 
under border measures that are limited to trademark and copyright 
violations. Moreover, in the unlikely event that the trademark issue rose to 
the level of willful trademark counterfeiting on a commercial scale, third-
party supplies and distributors could constitute criminal aiding and abetting; 
an innocent supplier to a producer, who later turned out to be a willful 
counterfeiter, could suddenly be deemed a criminal offender under Article 
2.14.4 of ACTA. 
                                                                                                                            
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/cr/ds408-1(cr).pdf.  
41 ACTA, supra note 2, footnote 6. 
42 See Press Release, Health Action International, Another Seizure of Generic 
Medicines Destined for a Developing Country, This Time in Frankfurt (June 5, 2009), 
available at http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/june-5-press-
release-frankfurt-seizure.pdf (describing an in-transit seizure of generic Amoxicillin from 
India to the Republic of Vanuatu by German customs officials on May 5, 2009, because of 
alleged trademark confusion with GlaxoSmithKline’s off-patent brand name medicine 
“Amoxil”).  
43 Medicines are said to be bioequivalent if generic versions have the same mode of 
administration (e.g., oral capsule or tablet) and the same rate of absorption and elimination 
of the active ingredient(s) in the human body as the original, previously registered product.  
Bioequivalence tests merely require a so-called crossover studies, involving a relatively 
small number of human subjects, instead of the expense and delay of duplicative Phrase I-
III clinical trials.  See, e.g., Food and Drug Admin., Guidance for Industry:  Statistical 
Approaches to Establishing Bioequivalence (2001), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidan
ces/ucm070244.pdf.  Because the size and shape of a medicine can affect the 
bioequivalence of a generic medicine with its comparator, generic manufacturers often 
need to make their medicine’s trade dress (appearance) close to that of the originator.  
Although generic manufacturers should never affix a trademark or to stamp a pill with the 
originator’s brand, the overall similarity of appearance might reasonably confuse a customs 
agent. 
44 See Sean Flynn, Note on ACTA and Access to Medicines (2010), available at 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/blog-post/note-on-acta-and-access-to-medicines. 
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IV. ACTA NEGOTIATORS ARE PURSUING PHRMA’S ENFORCEMENT GOALS 
BOTH IN ACTA AND IN TRADE AGREEMENTS 
 
The European Commission, when releasing the April Predecisional 
Draft, asserted that “ACTA will not hamper access to generic medicines.”45 
However, the analysis above shows otherwise.  Confirming health 
advocates fears, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of 
America (PhRMA) has advocated even more extreme and precisely defined 
application.  In PhRMA’s Comments to the USTR on ACTA (2008), 
PhRMA wanted the Agreement to explicitly impose intermediary liability 
on Internet Service Providers and other operators, on entities that engage in 
parallel trade, on suppliers of APIs and other bulk pharmaceutical 
ingredients, and on distributors of generic medicines.   
 
1. PhRMA Recommendation: Establish liability for Internet 
Service Providers and Other Operators that Facilitate Trade in 
Counterfeit Medical Products.  “Expressly prohibit online activities 
that directly or indirectly facilitate trade in counterfeit medical 
products and provide legal incentives for ISPs and online 
intermediaries to cooperate with legitimate manufacturers in 
combating counterfeiting activities. . . .  We note that Korea recently 
implemented a system for taking down web sites selling counterfeits, 
and recommend examination of that system for possible adaptation 
and use in other countries to combat online counterfeit medicines.” 
2. PhRMA Recommendation:  Provide Effective Border 
Enforcement against the Importation and Exportation of Counterfeit 
Medical Products.  “[W]ithout effective controls against diversion, 
parallel trade in pharmaceuticals becomes a potential pathway for 
the introduction of counterfeit medical products.  ACTA members 
should also be required to prohibit the distribution of medical 
products diverted from legitimate distribution channels and such 
distribution of diverted products should be treated as a 
counterfeiting offense.” 
3. PhRMA Recommendation: Ensure that criminal and 
administrative remedies extend to all upstream and downstream links 
in the drug counterfeiting channel, including the supply of 
unauthorized bulk chemicals and the distribution of finished 
                                                 
45 Press Release, European Commission, Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement:  
European Commission Welcomes Release of Negotiation Documents (Apr. 21, 2010), 
available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=552. 
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counterfeit products. “Effective anti-counterfeiting enforcement 
depends critically upon law enforcement’s ability to block so-called 
chokepoints in the counterfeiting manufacture and distribution 
channel, from the upstream supply of raw materials to the 
downstream distribution of finished products. In the case of 
counterfeit medical products, this holistic approach to enforcement 
necessitates effective enforcement tools and remedies to stop the 
unauthorized manufacture and supply (both domestic and 
international) of the bulk chemicals used to produce counterfeit 
medical products, as well as measures to prevent the unauthorized 
wholesale and retail distribution of counterfeit products.”46 
Equally troubling is the fact that the U.S. and E.C. will not stop with 
ACTA with respect to third-party enforcement.  Even before ACTA, they 
have incorporated provisions requiring enforcement measures against third 
parties.  For example, in the EU/Colombia/Peru EPA,47 there is an article on 
provisional and precautionary measures, Art. 232, that states that “parties 
shall provide that the judicial authorities may, at the request of the 
applicant, issue an interlocutory injunction against any party intended to 
prevent any imminent infringement…”48  Even more problematic are 
provisions on injunctions, Art. 234.  There, footnote 64 states that 
injunctions can be applied not only against the infringer, but also against 
those whose services have been used to infringe IPR to the extent that have 
been involved in the process.  The meaning of “involved in the process” is 
remarkably imprecise.  Pursuant to the preceding analysis, does it mean that 
an NGO buying an allegedly infringing medicines will not be able to deliver 
the medicines to its patients or that a drug regulatory authority can be 
enjoined from registering a medicine? 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
PhRMA and its ACTA negotiating surrogates have vigorous ambitions 
that ACTA and other enforcement treaties be applied upstream and 
downstream to manufacturing, supply, and distribution channels to stop 
parallel and generic trade in medicines.  Although their tools of preference 
                                                 
46 James Love, PhRMA Comments on ACTA:  ISP Liability, Parallel Trade and 
Generic APIs, Knowledge Ecology International, July 5, 2008, available at 
http://keionline.org/node/73. 
47 See http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?article17138.  
48 This could potentially be used against NGOs or international medicines programmes 
trying to deliver generics. However, this possibility depends upon national legislation 
providing it, since the article starts by saying “in accordance with their domestic 
legislation”. States therefore preserve their margin of maneuver. 
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include broad inclusion of the intellectual property rights, border/in-transit 
measures, and ubiquitous injunctions that might interfere with government 
use licenses and judicially-granted royalty schemes, PhRMA and its captive 
trade negotiators also want to use third-party enforcement measures to 
dampen generic trade.  The dangers to third parties under ACTA are not 
limited to ISPs; the danger extends to all who contribute to the supply, 
manufacture, registration, procurement, and distribution of generic 
medicines that must go through the choke-points of international trade 
where ephemeral and fictional patent and trademark-confusion rights might 
prevent the cross-border trade of medicines lawfully produced in the 
country of export and lawfully consumed in the country of import.   
Although it is very late in the game to slow down the ACTA juggernaut, 
which has now reached its final stages,49 there are still opportunities at the 
national level to challenge the agreement substantively and procedurally.  
Even if ACTA comes into force and is enacted in particular countries, much 
can be done to corral its interpretation to minimize the reach of third-party 
enforcement, to narrowly construe its jurisdictional reach, to strictly define 
“entering into the channels of commerce,” and to limit aider and abettor 
criminal liability.  Health advocates must join forces internationally to 
eliminate or reduce the risks to access to medicines codified in the proposed 
ACTA text.  Advocate can still try to forestall ACTA’s approval at the 
national level and to narrow and ameliorate provisions in implementing 
legislation that could adversely impact supplier, distributors and enablers of 
generic trade in low-cost generic medicines of assured quality. 
                                                 
49 Press Release, Eur. Comm’n:  Trade, Joint Statement from all Negotiating Parties to 
ACTA (Oct. 2, 2010), available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=623&serie=370&langId=en.  
